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[Excerpt] In the past decade, the number of worker-owned firms or ESOPs (Employee Stock Ownership 
Plans) has been growing geometrically. The national law granting tax incentives to ESOPs was passed in 
1975, and since then several other pieces of legislation promoting employee ownership have passed at 
the federal level and in eight state legislatures. As a result of the technical assistance and industrial 
revenue bonds that some states now provide for ESOP development, and as a result of demonstrable tax, 
productivity, labor relations and even marketing advantages, business has taken note of the ESOP option. 
Several thousand ESOPs have started and scores of reports on employee ownership have appeared in the 
popular press and in business and trade publications. 
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Will Benefit 
from ESOPs? 
• Joyce Rothschild-Whitt 
In the past decade, the number of worker-owned firms or ESOPs 
(Employee Stock Ownership Plans) has been growing 
geometrically. The national law granting tax incentives to ESOPs 
was passed in 1975, and since then several other pieces of 
legislation promoting employee ownership have passed at the 
federal level and in eight state legislatures. As a result of the 
technical assistance and industrial revenue bonds that some states 
now provide for ESOP development, and as a result of 
demonstrable tax, productivity, labor relations and even marketing 
advantages, business has taken note of the ESOP option. Several 
thousand ESOPs have started and scores of reports on employee 
ownership have appeared in the popular press and in business 
and trade publications. 
Although the most widely discussed worker-ownership cases 
have emerged in response to the threat of a plant shutdown, the 
National Center for Employee Ownership finds that, in fact, only 
18.5% have arisen as buy-outs of endangered companies. Indeed, 
most ESOPs have been developed in brand-new companies 
because of their financial, marketing and productivity advantages, 
or they have been used as a means of selling an established and 
viable company to its employees, sometimes as part of an estate 
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plan as the owner of a privately-held firm approaches retirement. 
Again, the law provides attractive tax incentives for doing so.1 
The first wave of ESOP development (1975-80) was mainly 
initiated by business, but there is evidence that a second wave 
is now underway, post-1980, eliciting substantial worker and union 
involvement. This paper will show that ESOPs are not all alike, 
that in fact, the ESOP is a flexible instrument with the potential 
to move in several different, if not contradictory, directions. 
Some people argue that ESOPs, and other forms of worker 
ownership, are inherently cooptive devices meant to undermine 
worker solidarity. Others argue that worker ownership inherently 
confers worker control. I will argue that the future form that 
ESOPs take, and who they will come to benefit, is not set in 
concrete. While it is true that existing ESOPs often serve 
managerial interests, ESOPs can be made to serve the needs of 
workers and communities, too. The outcome will depend upon 
what actions workers, unions and communities take. 
Union Views of ESOPs 
Two surveys tell the story of how union views toward ESOPs 
are changing. The first survey, conducted in 1977, asked national 
union leaders for a general assessment of employee ownership. 
Three-quarters of those surveyed were "basically negative." Three 
years later, however, a survey of trade union leaders found only 
29% negative to employee ownership. Moreover, there was a 
marked difference between those international officers whose 
locals had some experience with employee ownership and those 
who had not. Virtually none of the respondents who had observed 
worker ownership in one or more of their locals expressed 
disapproval,2 suggesting that as trade unionists acquire more 
experience with worker ownership, their attitudes are getting more 
positive. 
I believe that trade unionists' increasingly favorable (or 
decidedly less negative) view of worker ownership reflects 
objective changes taking place in the types of ESOPs being created. 
In the early days of employee ownership (the 1970s), the union 
position could best be described as ambivalent. Worker ownership 
was not the unions' issue. It was not conceived, designed or even 
anticipated by the unions. It was conceived by conservatives who 
believed that broadened ownership could revitalize or stabilize 
capitalism, and was translated into a set of legal tax advantages 
designed to make business stop and take note. 
But in the late 1970s as industrial shutdowns spread, particularly 
in unionized firms, worker ownership quickly won the support 
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of many local managements and local unions. Under the cloud 
of threatened job loss, issues of job security naturally move to the 
fore, and workers' ownership had prima facie appeal to workers 
who would otherwise lose their jobs. After the appropriate 
feasibility studies indicated that an operation could be viable if 
reorganized under the terms of an ESOP, we witnessed numerous 
cases where local management and working people worked 
cooperatively to mobilize the necessary financial and community 
support to "save" the plant. This process, at least for the time 
being, brought management and labor together in a unified cause, 
but what did it do for workers and unions? 
In the mid-1970s, international union leaders had some difficulty 
formulating a stance on worker ownership. On the one hand, it 
would be unseemly for union leaders to oppose an effort that stood 
a chance of preserving jobs. On the other hand, they had at least 
four good reasons to suspect the whole idea. First, some trade 
unionists recalled that unions had supported the formation of 
worker cooperatives in the nineteenth century without much 
success. Second, national union leaders feared locals that survived 
by way of an ESOP would be forced to take substantial pay 
reductions, which could undermine the wages and benefits 
generally prevailing in an industry. Third, ESOPs had sometimes 
entailed the dropping of hard-won pension plans. The substitution 
of ESOP stock in a possibly shaky employer for a more diversified 
set of pension investments struck many trade unionists, quite 
justifiably, as risky. Beyond these concerns, trade union leaders 
worried that the union might have no place in an employee-owned 
firm. This was expressed in the often repeated statement, "you 
can't bargain with yourself." 
Ironically, as economic conditions set the stage for the explosive 
development of employee ownership, unions were caught without 
a policy and without any in-depth information on the subject. The 
national unions could not help but be concerned about job 
preservation, but the apparent contradiction between collective 
bargaining and worker ownership left them so immobilized that 
they were generally of little help to local unions in formulating 
ESOPs. This left the initiative in the hands of local managers, who 
were soon followed by local workers and community leaders. The 
fact of management initiative then became another reason for 
suspicion by the international unions. The notion that the 
traditional adversarial relationship might be suspended in favor 
of cooperation understandably brought fears that management 
would use this as an opportunity for productivity speed-up, 
without sharing the productivity gains with the workers. 
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Indeed, most of the ESOP cases initiated by owners and 
managers in the 1970s did not extend formal voting rights to 
workers, much less democratic participation. Studies found that 
in management-initiated cases, managers were ordinarily so 
preoccupied with legal, financial and technical concerns that they 
failed to consider what social and organizational changes the new 
ownership structure might imply.3 A recent survey by the National 
Center for Employee Ownership estimates that perhaps 50% of 
the majority worker-owned firms provide for full voting rights, 
but that refers only to voting one's stock, which is nearly always 
unequally distributed.4 An earlier survey of 299 manager-initiated 
ESOPs established in 1975-76 found that in only 3% of the cases 
were the ESOP trustees selected by the employees, and only 21% 
of the companies gave the ESOP participants full voting rights. 
When managers were asked why they had instituted the ESOP, 
51% said they wanted to improve productivity, 35% wanted to 
finance company growth, and 8% admitted to wanting to avoid 
unionization.5 
So What's Changed? 
Since 1980, precisely because unions have become more actively 
involved in the worker ownership issue, we have seen very 
different types of cases develop. These recent cases provide a 
signal of what unions and workers can hope to gain from ESOPs. 
There are at least two ways in which the ESOP form of 
ownership can be used to advance worker and community 
interests. It can be used to enhance the material well-being and 
job security of the worker, and where ESOPs are used as an 
alternative to shutdowns, this spares the community the 
devastating "multiplier effect" wherein several jobs may be lost 
in the community for each job lost in the actual shutdown. Second, 
ESOPs can be used to extend the sphere of worker influence in 
the workplace, and this should make the content of pricing and 
product decisions more responsive to public need. 
To illustrate, consider the new bargaining strategy used 
successfully at several of the airlines. It started with Pan Am. On 
the brink of financial collapse, Pan Am claimed it needed wage 
reductions in order to survive. The claim was credible, but the 
union leaders countered by demanding stock in exchange. 
Ultimately the workers negotiated a 12% voting interest in Pan 
Am, receiving $3 worth of stock for every $9 sacrificed in pay. 
Now that Pan Am is solvent again, the stock is worth $5, so the 
employees have made back nearly two-thirds of their original pay 
cut. And Dick Phenneger, who led the union bargaining effort, 
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reports that the employees are using their 12% interest in Pan Am 
to influence corporate policy. Inspired by the Pan Am example, 
employees at Western Airlines insisted on stock in return for a 
pay cut they would have had to take anyway. They won an 18% 
share of the company, with full voting rights. Similarly, employees 
at Eastern got a 25% ESOP. The extent to which this strategy has 
spread throughout the airline industry in less than two years is 
indicative of its potential. 
The UAW has been the first major national union to suggest 
worker ownership in its contract talks. Arising again in a time of 
crisis, the Chrysler Loan Guarantee Act provided Chrysler 
employees with 15-20% of the total company stock. The UAW 
made the argument to Congress that if the government is going 
to make loans to private corporations, the cost to the taxpayers 
is more justified if the benefits of the loan are spread more broadly 
to the workers rather than concentrating only on the investors. 
Over 1981-82, $81 million worth of Chrysler stock was allocated 
to the employees. Because of Chrysler's comeback, that stock 
quadrupled in value, and now holds a valuation of approximately 
$350 million, the total value of the sizable concessions that the 
workers made.6 In addition, Doug Fraser, former president of the 
UAW, was put on the board at Chrysler. 
Since there is no reason to believe that contract concessions in 
the auto or airline industry would have been any smaller had the 
workers not gotten stock in return, the unions' insistence that 
companies match any wage concessions with stock has been a 
plus for workers and a very important new bargaining strategy. 
The other way in which unions are just beginning to use ESOPs 
to further worker interests is in recent attempts to establish 
"democratic ESOPs." The pioneering case of this kind, and one 
that has received a great deal of attention in both union and 
business circles, is Rath Packing Co. in Waterloo, Iowa. After a 
long corporate decline and substantial worker sacrifices in wages 
during the 1970s, the company asked the workers to take even 
deeper cuts in 1979. The union leaders, representing the United 
Food and Commercial Workers, refused, unless a transfer of 
ownership and change in management could be gotten in return. 
This case differs from many others in that it was the local union 
that took the initiative. 
After extensive negotiations, a complex plan was worked out 
whereby the workers would have $20 per week deducted from 
their pay in return for 60% of the Rath stock, with 50-50 profit 
sharing between the company and the workers. What makes this 
plan the first of its kind is the provision that workers elect their 
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Board members on a one worker-one vote basis, not on the basis 
of number of shares owned. Final approval of the ESOP came in 
December of 1980, and subsequently union and management 
worked together to effect major changes in labor-management 
relations, from the shop floor to the boardroom. With the 
assistance of researchers from Cornell University "action-research 
teams" were set up in many departments, and after training in 
group process and problem-solving skills, many of these teams 
made impressive productivity improvements, without which the 
company could not have survived. Groups have been involved 
in everything from strategic planning, to the types of new 
machines that should be bought, to safety issues. Arising out of 
a truly desperate situation (where employee ownership would not 
ordinarily be counselled), the involvement of the workers in the 
ownership and decision making at Rath is credited with substantial 
productivity gains. 
Recently, however, Rath has suffered severe financial strains 
(including filing for bankruptcy), and in this context, labor-
management relations have deteriorated, grievances have gone up, 
and the action research teams have been suspended. Union leaders 
blame ineffectual labor representatives on the board and 
inadequate worker education for worker ownership, but still 
maintain that the democratic ESOP plan was "perfect." (See 
interview with Gene Redmon and Chuck Mueller elsewhere in 
this issue of Labor Research Review.) To me this case underscores 
the importance of considering the market before going into an 
ESOP or any other business. At Rath wage cuts, productivity gains, 
an intense and cooperative desire to succeed, and a well-designed 
ESOP forestalled but could not block a basic market failure. 
Following the lead at Rath in setting up a democratic ESOP, UAW 
Local 726 organized a $53 million buy-out of a bearing plant from 
GM. The 100% worker-owned company, now called Hyatt Clark 
Industries, was established in October 1981. Workers put up $ 100 
each to hire an outside consultant to do a feasibility study. Based 
on the results of the study, the workers agreed to a 100% ESOP, 
with a 30% reduction in wages, about half of which is expected 
to be made up through a profit-sharing plan. What makes this plan 
unusual is that the shares are not allocated differentially according 
to wages. Everyone gets an equal share of stock, and therefore, 
an equal voting right (although they cannot vote the stock until 
1990). The initial board has three union representatives, but over 
time (recall that ESOPs only gradually transfer ownership) workers 
will elect the whole Board. Although the International UAW took 
a neutral or indifferent stance in this case, they did learn from 
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it and in the 1984 cases involving UAW members (Atlas Chain and 
Seymour Specialty Wire) the International UAW actively fostered 
worker ownership. 
The brand new "O & O" stores in Philadelphia (so named 
because they are worker-owned and operated) represent yet 
another unprecedented scheme for democratic worker ownerhip. 
In this case, when A & P announced that they would shut down 
many of their stores in Philadelphia, the United Food and 
Commercial Workers representing 2000 members who would have 
lost their jobs, actively put together and ultimately ratified a 
collective bargaining agreement whereby A & P will contribute 
1% of gross sales at its Super Fresh stores to a union-controlled 
trust to be used to finance worker cooperatives. The union has 
options on a number of A & P properties and is determining which 
would be most viable, and it has rights-of-first-refusal on the leases 
of remaining stores should the company decide to sell or franchise 
them in the future. In October 1982, the union opened up the first 
couple of stores. They are set up as worker cooperatives with 
ownership as a condition of employment, one worker—one vote, 
and full participation in policy and planning. Although workers 
must make an investment of $5,000 in the coop (these are not 
ESOPs), worker interest in joining is very high, and sales are 
reportedly good. 
Finally, in the most ambitious example to date, the heads of 13 
unions representing the employees of Conrail are acting in concert 
to put together a proposal for a worker buy-out of Conrail. Last 
year the government announced that it would sell Conrail by the 
end of 1984. Whether or not the union-sponsored bid is accepted, 
at least partial employee ownership seems likely, making Conrail 
the largest case of its kind, with some 40,000 employees. It is the 
first case where the heads of national unions have initiated a bid 
to buy a company that is not failing. 
All four of these cases, started between 1980 and 1984, contrast 
sharply with the sorts of cases we saw in the 1970s. They were 
initiated and actively organized by local unions, not by 
management. The internationals assisted or took a neutral stance, 
in contrast to a case like South Bend Lathe in the mid-1970s, where 
the International was hostile to the conditions of the ESOP and 
the local's role in it. These four recent cases were union-sponsored, 
and as a result, the worker-ownership brought with it worker voice 
in company affairs, access to information so that workers could 
oversee their investment, formal positions on the Board, and 
democratic voting rights. 
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The Future is Made, Not Predicted 
The idea of worker ownership has attracted diverse 
constituencies in the U.S., including politicians from the left along 
with those from the right, owners and managers along with 
workers, church and community leaders. Like many important 
social inventions in their early stages of development, worker 
ownership could develop in a number of different directions in 
the U.S., depending upon which of its constituencies manages to 
shape the issue. 
There can be little question that worker ownership carries the 
potential to benefit workers and their organizations. Recall that 
the transfer of ownership in the ESOP is gradual. As the principal 
on the loan is repaid, the shares are allocated to the employees. 
It would not be unusual, for example, for it to take 18 years for 
51% of the stock to be released in this fashion and 25 years for 
100% of the stock to be allocated. In studies in which I participated 
at Cornell University, we found that workers in the 1970s tended 
to go into ESOPs with vague expectations of more say and more 
respect in the firm and that management tended to go in thinking 
it would give them a more motivated or compliant workforce. 
Without either side making specific plans to accommodate these 
rather inchoate expectations, hopes got dashed and industrial 
relations deteriorated. Nevertheless, as the ESOP mechanism 
distributes stock slowly, workers have a long time before they 
become majority owners. Over time workers may well recognize 
that ownership and voting rights provide a legal foundation upon 
which they can mobilize for greater information, greater voice, 
and more socially useful products. 
Management and small business owners were quick to grasp 
ESOPs, as were workers who were facing job loss. The unions took 
a few more years, but they too seem to be coming around to 
worker ownership—not out of some a priori ideological 
commitment, but out of the practical opportunities it offers for 
job preservation, for getting shares of stock in return for 
concessions that would be exacted anyway, and for advancing 
democratic control of the workplace. The outcomes for the 
individual worker-owned firms and the outcomes for this 
movement as a whole depend to a great extent on who stays 
involved in bringing the changes about. 
If workers and their union representatives continue to take the 
initiative in planning and developing ESOPs, as they did in the 
four post-1980 cases discussed in this article, we can expect to see 
more majority worker-owned firms, with more worker control on 
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the shop floor, more access to corporate information, and more 
avenues for worker and community voices at higher levels, 
including the Board room. Following the example of Rath Packing, 
we will see the development of more "democratic ESOPs," utilizing 
the cooperative principle of "one worker—one vote." 
On the other hand, if management continues to dominate the 
planning of ESOPs, we can expect to see more ESOPs with 
minority worker ownership stakes and without any special 
avenues for worker participation. In this case, the ESOP will come 
to be seen by all concerned as a simple supplement to wages like 
a profit-sharing plan or a pension, signifying no essential alteration 
in the social relations of production. The future edt.worker 
ownership will be determined by those constituencies who remain 
actively involved. • 
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